CAN HUNGARY CHANGE THE ELITE WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE STATE?

Since taking office, the Hungarian government and parliament have been working to deliver on a central promise to their voters: to rid the state and political environment of the influence of the previous government.

The task is no small one. In a country of almost 10 million people, the great challenge is how to change the political elite while delivering on promises made to voters without disrupting the functioning of the state.

This is not an entirely new problem. One of the classical challenges faced by Central European countries after the fall of communism was that, even though the political system changed and democracy became the new norm, economic power and the influence derived from privileged access to information often remained in the hands of the same players. These were individuals who had been part of the state and political machinery during communism and who managed to preserve their influence under the new system.

In modern-day Hungary, the current government aims to dismantle the pyramid of political and institutional power built during the 16 years of Fidesz governing.

Given this long period, important state institutions are still led by individuals who were appointed under, or were loyal to, the previous government. The Tisza government, driven both by its electoral promises and by the physics of political power, now faces pressure to replace them with individuals it can trust.

The great question is how many members of the former elite will be willing to change sides, and whether the Tisza government will be willing to accept their capitulation.

In many cases, accepting their newfound loyalty may contradict the expectations of voters who demanded a genuine change of the political elite. On the other hand, refusing to cooperate with experienced individuals from the previous administration may disrupt the functioning of state institutions and, potentially, even the economy.

After all, replacing the head of an institution is rarely as simple as appointing someone new. Such changes can unsettle an entire administration, interrupt established procedures, and create uncertainty until the new leadership settles in. This takes time and may also cost money.

The government must find a balance between political change and institutional stability. Replace too few, and it risks disappointing its voters. Replace too many, and it risks undermining the very institutions it has been elected to govern.

The question is whether Hungary can achieve a genuine change of political elites without paying too high a price for the transition.