TÖLGYESSY: HUNGARY HAS CHANGED BUT HAS ITS POLITICS?
Region: Hungary
Author: Laszlo Enyedi • September 14, 2026
Hungary’s change of government was more than an electoral turnover. It brought millions of citizens into politics as active participants, but it may also be creating another dangerously unbalanced political system.
Mr Péter Tölgyessy is one of Hungary’s most important public intellectuals. A lawyer, political scientist and former politician, he participated in the negotiations that prepared Hungary’s democratic transition, later led the liberal SZDSZ and served in parliament between 1990 and 2006. His significance today, however, comes primarily from his ability to think objectively: he remains independent of political camps and is willing to follow an argument even when its conclusion is uncomfortable for his own audience. Thus he is the go to person if you want to understand Hungarian politics for what it really is.
In a recent lecture organised by Partizán, Tölgyessy described Hungary’s latest election as an extraordinary democratic moment. A government many voters had regarded as immovable peacefully surrendered power. More importantly, citizens did not merely cast their ballots and return home. They became emotionally invested in political change and increasingly regarded the country’s future as their own personal responsibility.
In Tölgyessy’s interpretation, Hungary may only now be becoming a genuine mass democracy. The exceptionally high turnout, the enthusiasm surrounding the new government and the emergence of volunteers all suggest that politics is no longer something people simply watch from outside.
Yet his analysis was far from celebratory.
Hungarian politics has repeatedly “tilted” from one dominant force towards another. Parties that once appeared permanent—the MDF, the Socialist Party and now Fidesz—could rapidly lose their position when public opinion moved decisively against them. The electoral system may magnify such changes, but it does not create them.
The same danger now faces the new government. Péter Magyar has united an extraordinarily broad coalition and acquired overwhelming political authority. But the internal and external checks on that authority remain weak. Fidesz is unlikely to become an effective opposition while retreating into a defensive position of permanent victimhood. Institutions may offer limited resistance, while much of the media still seeks to persuade the prime minister rather than organise public scrutiny of his government.
This leaves Hungarian citizens as the most important remaining counterweight to power. Tölgyessy’s central message was therefore demanding rather than reassuring. Hungary has regained the possibility of deciding its own future, but political participation cannot end with electoral victory. If citizens cease to question the new government, the country could reproduce the same concentration of power it has just rejected.
WHY THIS MATTERS
Tölgyessy’s analysis is valuable precisely because it refuses the comforting certainties of either side. He recognises the historic importance of the political change while warning that democratic enthusiasm is not itself a guarantee of democratic government. Hungary’s opportunity is real—but so is the risk that one dominant political system will simply be replaced by another.