GEOGRAPHY DOES NOT NEGOTIATE

In the aftermath of the 2022 energy crisis, Europe appeared to move in a common direction. In contrast to earlier trends, governments seemingly understood the new energy order unfolding before them and rushed to diversify supply, expand storage capacity, and reduce their exposure to external shocks.

Yet several years later, a different picture is beginning to emerge. Eastern Europe is increasingly fragmented in terms of energy strategy. Countries across the region are pursuing their own distinct approaches to energy security. Inevitably, these choices will lead to different economic realities. The full consequences, however, will only become visible once global energy markets regain a degree of relative balance. For now, that moment appears no closer than it did a year ago.

There is one undeniable reality that remains unchanged: Russia has not moved. Its geographical proximity continues to shape—or at the very least influence—the energy logic of Eastern Europe, regardless of the political strategies individual countries choose to pursue.

Serbia continues to deepen its cooperation with Russia and has recently extended its existing gas arrangements with Gazprom. Moldova, by contrast, is expanding mandatory gas reserves, strengthening its connections with Romania, and aligning itself more closely with European energy regulations. Further north, Lithuania's Klaipėda LNG terminal has secured long-term capacity bookings extending well into the next decade, attracting customers from Finland, Ukraine, and across the Baltic region.

At first glance, these developments appear unrelated. In reality, they reveal a deeper transformation taking place across the region.

Therefore, the central question is no longer whether energy exists, but whether it can reliably reach the place where it is needed.

Recent events around the Strait of Hormuz offer a constant and menacing reminder of this reality. Even with a ceasefire agreement expected to be signed in Geneva, the market's reaction revealed something important: it remains nervous. Prices fell quickly on news of de-escalation, yet the speed of the reaction demonstrated how sensitive energy markets remain to geopolitical developments.

The market's primary concern was not whether sufficient oil existed globally, but whether it could continue to move freely through one of the world's most important transport corridors. Even as tensions have begun to ease, questions remain about how quickly inventories and supply chains can fully recover. Energy security increasingly depends not only on production, but on the infrastructure and routes that connect supply with demand.

For this reason, energy policy is, to a growing extent, becoming infrastructure policy.

Storage facilities, LNG terminals, pipelines, interconnectors, transmission networks, and cross-border connections are increasingly determining the resilience of national energy systems. The strategic importance of projects once viewed as technical details is growing rapidly. Energy security is becoming less dependent on molecules themselves and more dependent on the systems through which those molecules travel.

This trend is particularly visible in Hungary. The country's future energy position will not be determined solely by domestic generation projects or fuel contracts. Hungary's role increasingly depends on its ability to remain connected to multiple supply routes and regional infrastructure systems simultaneously. Partnerships with Azerbaijan, expanding regional interconnections, significant gas storage capacities, and ongoing investments in electricity infrastructure all point in this direction.

What emerges across Eastern Europe is not a single model of energy security, but a collection of competing strategies. Some countries continue to rely on traditional suppliers. Others are investing heavily in LNG, storage capacity, and deeper integration with European markets.

The irony is that after decades of globalisation and years of discussing so-called energy independence and interdependence, reality is once again becoming one of the most important factors in energy policy. Crises have a habit of exposing reality. They push rhetoric into the background and force governments to react to circumstances rather than assumptions.

The future of regional energy security may ultimately depend less on who produces the energy and more on who controls the routes, networks, and infrastructure through which it flows.

Strategies may differ. Governments may change. Markets may adapt. Geography does not negotiate.