HUNGARY’S CONSTITUTIONAL RESET: THE REAL TEST COMES NEXT

Hungarian President Tamás Sulyok signed the Seventeenth Amendment to the Fundamental Law on 18 July, despite maintaining serious objections to its substance.

The amendment was adopted by the National Assembly on 13 July. Its most immediate consequence is the termination of Sulyok’s presidential mandate on the day following its entry into force. The National Assembly will subsequently have to elect a new head of state.

The amendment also introduces a 12-year—or three-term—limit for members of Parliament, establishes an upper age limit of 70 for judges of the Constitutional Court, changes elements of judicial governance, and provides the constitutional foundation for a new National Office for Asset Recovery and Protection.

Sulyok strongly criticised the amendment before signing it. In an official statement, he argued that several of its provisions violate the principles of the rule of law, democracy and the separation of powers. He described the termination of a sitting president’s mandate through a provision written specifically for that individual as unprecedented in Hungary’s post-communist democracy.

Nevertheless, Sulyok explained that the Fundamental Law does not permit the president to challenge the substance of a constitutional amendment. The president may request a review by the Constitutional Court only if the procedural requirements governing the amendment’s adoption were violated. Having found no procedural basis upon which he could withhold his signature, Sulyok signed the amendment and ordered its publication.

AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL MOMENT

What is happening in Hungary is an extraordinary political situation—and it can still go either way.

If the government pays careful attention to public opinion at every step, and if it works toward the proper separation of powers, the present process could ultimately strengthen Hungarian democracy. Democracy requires strong institutions, and the reconstruction of those institutions is necessarily a difficult and delicate undertaking.

As of this moment, however, nothing has been definitively won or lost. What matters most is what comes next.

Who will become Hungary’s next president? Will the future members of the Constitutional Court be able to make just and objective decisions, even when those decisions are politically inconvenient for the government that appointed them? Will the National Office for Asset Recovery and Protection grow into a strong and independent institution capable of ensuring transparency in the finances of both the previous government and future governments?

These and many other questions are extremely important. At present, we do not know the answers. For now, one should give the government a fair chance to prove that it can build strong and independent institutions.

The amendment itself cannot tell us whether Hungary’s institutions will ultimately become stronger or whether political power will merely be redistributed. That will depend on how the new constitutional arrangements are implemented, who is appointed to lead the institutions, and whether those institutions are permitted to exercise genuine independence.

POWER MUST CREATE LIMITS UPON ITSELF

History teaches us that periods such as this are extremely delicate. When one political entity gains great power, it must use that power to establish institutions capable of limiting its own authority. It is relatively easy for a government to create institutions that constrain its opponents. The real test is whether it creates institutions that can also constrain the government itself.

The previous Hungarian government was not particularly successful in doing so. Over time, the distinction between lasting constitutional institutions and the political interests of the governing majority became increasingly blurred. Correcting that legacy is a legitimate democratic objective—but the method by which it is corrected will be just as important as the objective itself.

A government cannot restore trust in institutions simply by replacing the individuals who lead them. It must establish rules, safeguards and political norms that allow those institutions to remain independent after the present government has left office.

This is why it will take time to understand how the current transformation will unfold. The true measure of success will not be how effectively the government removes the remnants of the previous political system. It will be whether the new system can function independently of the political force that created it.

THE NEXT PRESIDENT WILL BE THE FIRST INDICATOR

The next major step will be the selection of a new president. His or her personality, professional record and relationship with the governing majority will provide an important early indication of what is to come. A president capable of acting independently—even when doing so is uncomfortable for the government—would signal a genuine commitment to rebuilding the separation of powers.

A figure chosen primarily for political loyalty would send the opposite message.

Hungary is therefore entering a decisive period, but the final direction of that period has not yet been determined. The Seventeenth Amendment opens the door to substantial institutional change. Whether that change strengthens democracy or produces a new form of power concentration will depend on the decisions that follow.

The amendment is not the conclusion of Hungary’s democratic transformation. It is the beginning of its most important test.

Sources: Dr Tamás Sulyok’s official Facebook page, National Assembly of Hungary — adopted amendment, and the official statement of the Sándor Palace.